Countering the Call: The U.S., Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Religious Extremism in Central Asia by the Brookings Institution: My Thoughts

I have come across this report that was written in July 2003 regarding the policy the U.S should take on countering the call of 'extremist' groups, of which Hizb ut-Tahrir is classed as by the West. It is a particularly interesting read and proves that the call of the Hizb is far threatening to the West, and possibly more-so than violent extremism.

This article sheds a light on how the West are constantly fighting against the Islamic narrative and does not leave any group, no matter how big or small, out of their scope of focus. It is worth noting that this report is targeting the Hizb that was headed by Abd al-Kalim Zallum at the time and currently Ata Abu Rashta, this is why it quite rightly so agrees that the students of this Hizb hold contradictory views and cannot explain their position nor method when prompted. Quite contrast to the students under the correct leadership after the redress in 1997 due to fundamental differences on the method of resuming the Islamic way of life.

It begins by highlighting that the Hizb calls to "restoring the Ottoman Era caliphate" and that "it has been able to harness public popularity primarily through a commitment to nonviolence and an appeal for social and economic justice."

The report interestingly suggests the West's policy towards Hizb ut-Tahrir will set a framework for all other Islamic groups who call for non violent social change:

"Hizb-ut-Tahrir also represents a challenge for broader U.S. policy towards Muslim states and movements. How the United States chooses to respond to the emergence of HT in conjunction with governments in the region, as well as more broadly, sets a framework for how the United States will deal with Islamist groups nominally committed to nonviolent social change, who enjoy increasing grassroots support"

It goes on to suggest that moderating and modernising the Hizb's call to political Islam by including them into the secular and democratic framework "may provide key lessons for crafting a well-informed policy". This is exactly what we are seeing today, whereby Hizb Ata are enjoying platforms with non-Muslims as well as supporting armed groups in the Middle East, which drastically diverts the party from its originally stated method.

It is clear that this report is targeted at Hizb Ata as it states that "This worldwide organization is presently headed by Abd al-Kadim Zallum, also an ethnic Palestinian."

It quite rightly points out that "HT members strongly adhere to the belief that only the formation of an Islamic state regulated by Shariat, Islamic law, can address the ills of society. HT sees the process of modernization and secularization in many Muslim-populated countries as a Western plot against the umma, the Muslim community of believers as a whole."

It suggests that the growth of Hizb ut-Tahrir is partly due to "to underlying economic, social, and political issues that have made Central Asia fertile soil for the introduction of radical ideas." as this report focuses on Central Asia rather than the West. Although we can see that this statement is far from the truth as membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir, whether that be the correct leadership or the misled Hizb Ata has grown in many prosperous countries, such as the West. However it begs the question, whether students studying under the Hizb Ata leadership are serious students or just numbers filling out stadiums and rallies due to their incoherent and contradictory views on the prophetic method to re-establish the Caliphate.

The report has recognised correctly that both Hizb ut-Tahrir and Hizb Ata "calls for a return to Islamic values. In its most extreme political manifestation, the party’s goal is to establish a united Islamic caliphate that would spread from the Middle East through Central Asia to Muslim areas of South Asia."

It also distinguishes Hizb ut-Tahrir different to other 'extremist' Islamic groups by recognising that "an extremely significant factor in HT’s popularity is the party’s rejection of violence as a political means" - which was true in 2003, however the change in tact by Hizb Ata would make one think that there are serious issues internally after they back Jihadi factions in Syria in 2013, and claiming that the 'blessed revolution' has been hijacked.

The report by Khadimov notes that the Hizb's campaigns and leaflets have definitely been a factor in "minimal political participation of the population, the growth of distrust of authority, and skepticism about the utility of democratic institutions".

It goes on to say "growing appeal of its extreme views is a cause of concern for local, national, regional and international actors, including the U.S. government. HT’s rhetoric is often aggressive. It frequently incites anti-Semitic and anti-American sentiments. Following the events of September 11, 2001, HT has focused on casting itself as the voice of all Muslims in Central Asia, while presenting the cooperation of Central Asian governments with the U.S.-led anti-terrorist campaign as treason and tantamount to a war against Islam and Muslims"

It seems to suggest that one way of pushing Hizb members into militant and terrorist activity would be to 'demonize' and 'repress' them so that they feel 'disillusioned' into joining Al-Qaeda or IMU in Uzbekistan where Hizb Ata enjoys a large group of members. 

Quite unsurprisingly, the Brookings Institute has studied the method Hizb ut-Tahrir follow and briefly explained the three stages; the cultural, interaction and the establishment stage. However it is according to Hizb Ata methodology whereby each country has a difference in progress, it mentions that "In Central Asia, HT appears to be in its initial stage". 

Here is how the Brookings Institute has understood the method:

"The first stage is mainly a proselytizing or recruitment phase in which the party reaches out to Muslims in an effort to persuade them to accept the idea, mission, and goals of the party. Convinced individuals are invited to join the party and assume its methods and strategies. They are then expected to join the outreach effort."

"The second stage involves interaction with the umma, taking the message to the broader Muslim community. In this stage, HT attempts to persuade the umma to embrace its view of Islam so that the Islamic way of life becomes an everyday practice for each Muslim and encompasses all affairs of his/her life."

"The third stage sees the establishment of an Islamic government that will implement the norms and practices of Shariat, generally and comprehensively, and will carry it as a message to the world."

It is important to note that the East and West are trying to infiltrate Hizb ut-Tahrir by "planting agents into new HT cells" but are failing to achieve results due to the "veil of secrecy" behind its activities:

"Hizb-ut-Tahrir operates in Central Asian republics in small secretive cells of usually five to seven people called “doiras” or “halkas,” which make-up a large pyramidal structure. Headed by a mushrif (group leader), each group member knows only the members of his/her circle and only the mushrif knows the next stage superior. This arrangement also adds to both HT’s security and the veil of secrecy about its activities and motives. For example, it has made the attempts of the Uzbek police to plant agents in new HT cells and to penetrate the chain of command nearly impossible."

It seems that Hizb Ata have started to "enjoy handsome financial awards and incentives" for new members joining the party according to the report - not surprising to say  the least.

As mentioned earlier I have claimed that members of Hizb Ata fail to explain the method of the Hizb and the same frustration has been noted in this report when it mentions that it is "of particular concern are the vague future plans of HT in Central Asia. HT members often cannot explain how the caliphate would be achieved, what economic or social policies it would pursue, and what the role of other religious traditions and ethnicities in a truly Islamic society would be"

The report admits its frustration with the way in which Hizb ut-Tahrir works by distributing "leaflets and books that often contain scathing criticisms of regional governments. Party activists also rely on underground meetings rather than public speeches. These techniques make Hizb-ut-Tahrir operatives hard to find and to silence. They also let Hizb-ut-Tahrir members send messages more quickly than the government can suppress or discredit them." 

The "challenge is to create mechanisms under which HT could cease its aggressive rhetoric and become involved in the official political process" according to the report. The use of state-supported Imams or clergy is being used to "counter HT's message", however the are "incapable of presenting any credible arguments to counter HT doctrine in mosques" due to being "self-educated individuals with no higher religious education".

It recognises HT members to "enjoy a reputation as highly honest, incorruptible, and determined individuals" 

Finally the report advises the U.S government not to "designate HT as a terrorist organisation" as this would be a "a simplistic move that could legitimize the repressive measures of Central Asian governments" and "Branding Hizb-ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization will have serious implications for regional security. It will further embolden the ongoing official harassment of ordinary believers and lead to widespread public outcry. Such a measure will also be seen by local religious factions as an U.S. effort to support oppressive governments in the war against terrorism. As such, it will undermine U.S.-led efforts to counter Islamic extremism among local populations."

It also advises the U.S to "reconsider encouraging any blanket policy by Central Asian governments of viewing Islamic parties to be the enemy and instead work to bolster Islamic parties’ involvement in political process. The general lesson appears to be that while exclusion of such groups leads to violence, inclusion forces them to compete for voters and offer real governing options, leading them to moderate. Principled support of democracy and human rights, in this regard, is key to moderating radical Islamists."

It finishes off to suggest more backing for moderate imams to counter the Hizb's call. 

The full report here: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2003/7/asia-khamidov/khamidov20030701.pdf