Quote: Lt. Gen Michael Flynn former head of Defense Intelligence Agency

“The drone campaign right now really is only about killing. When you hear the phrase ‘capture/kill,’ capture is actually a misnomer. In the drone strategy that we have, ‘capture’ is a lower case ‘c.’ We don’t capture people anymore,” Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told The Intercept. “Our entire Middle East policy seems to be based on firing drones. That’s what this administration decided to do in its counterterrorism campaign. They’re enamored by the ability of special operations and the CIA to find a guy in the middle of the desert in some shitty little village and drop a bomb on his head and kill him.”

Only the Islamic Shield can Withstand the Onslaught by the Kuffar

It is patent to every observer that the Islamic Ummah is enduring her darkest days and her most awkward conditions. All and sundry have ganged up on her. Plots and conspiracies have been concocted to keep the Ummah incapable of reversing her situation and assuming her own affairs. After they had engrossed her for decades with the issue of Palestine, they embroiled her again for decades with the issue of Iraq, the "war on terror" and the Greater Middle East Initiative. All these engrossments, or rather all these conspiracies, have been designed to alienate the Ummah from her central issue and keep her a hostage to the vicious circle of a struggle with the Kafir West. Yet, this struggle is unbalanced since the West looks upon us as one single Ummah but deals with us as divided segments and endeavours to corroborate the separation and the fragmentation by entrenching the animosity among us whenever the opportunity arises.

Our main issue is neither Palestine nor Iraq or Syria or Egypt. These are vital issues that emanate from the central issue, namely establishing Islam in the realm of life. Any other effort exhausted towards other than this issue would sidetrack the Muslims and perpetuate the dominion of the Kuffar over their lands.  

As for the vital issues that stem from the central issue, such as the issues of Syria, Iraq and Palestine, the only fruitful effort towards settling these issues is to work in a country in control of its own security and free from the military presence of the Kuffar. This country should possess the faculties of a state so that it may be the nucleus of the Islamic state, through assiduous and effective work to fuse the masses with Islam in its quality as a rational Aqeedah from which a system emanates to regulate all life's affairs. Work should be concentrated in this country to prepare its people and their forces to support Islam and establish the Islamic State which will in turn work towards bringing the rest of the Islamic lands under its wing and towards liberating the occupied lands from the occupiers by expelling their forces.

As for the stance of the Muslim in Syria in particular, they should perceive that the criminal regime is conducting a war in which the Muslims are killing each other, their country is being destroyed and their faculties depleted; this dirty war is overseen by a malicious enemy, namely the Kafir West aided by Russia. They keep plotting and planning against the Muslims to perpetuate the crisis and weaken the regime and its opponents further in order to impose their own agenda on them and initiate a roadmap for a secular state to replace the secular Baath regime that oppresses the Muslims in Syria. If the Muslim perceived this reality, he would perceive his stance vis-à-vis this war: he should neither lean towards a secular Kafir Baath regime that kills the Muslims and sows the seeds of strife amongst them, nor should he side with an opposition that blatantly admits its relationship with the devious enemies of this Ummah and urges them to intervene militarily and supply it with sophisticated weapons. This does not mean the Muslim should remain confused about what course of action to pursue; he should rather work towards ending the bloodshed to the best of his ability. He should defend himself, his family and his property should anyone or any group transgresses his inviolabilities. If he cannot defend them, he should seek a safe haven if he could. His raison d'être should remain Islam. He should work towards its return by establishing the Islamic State. This is what is required from a Shari'ah perspective.   

Sawt-ul-Ummah - Issue 16

The Drone Papers: The Assassination Complex for the U.S. by The Intercept: TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS INTERCEPTED

The Intercept has obtained a cache of secret documents detailing the inner workings of the U.S. military’s assassination program in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia. The documents, provided by a whistleblower, offer an unprecedented glimpse into Obama’s drone wars.

Part 1 of the Drone Papers series is titled 'The Assassination Complex'. This article details the complex the U.S finds themselves in with their drone 'policy'. Explaining how the use of drones is not a policy but a tool, the policy is in fact assassination. A word that is rarely mentioned and masked by the term 'targeted killings' or 'legitimate targets'. 

Jeremy Scahill editor of The Intercept has written the first part of the series on the leaked/obtained papers on the U.S. military's assassination program using Drones. 

Here are the KEY points from the article:

The Intercept has obtained a cache of secret slides that provides a window into the inner workings of the U.S. military’s kill/capture operations at a key time in the evolution of the drone wars — between 2011 and 2013. The documents, which also outline the internal views of special operations forces on the shortcomings and flaws of the drone program, were provided by a source within the intelligence community who worked on the types of operations and programs described in the slides. The Intercept granted the source’s request for anonymity because the materials are classified and because the U.S. government has engaged in aggressive prosecution of whistleblowers. The stories in this series will refer to the source as “the source.”

“This outrageous explosion of watchlisting — of monitoring people and racking and stacking them on lists, assigning them numbers, assigning them ‘baseball cards,’ assigning them death sentences without notice, on a worldwide battlefield — it was, from the very first instance, wrong,” the source said.

Additional documents on high-value kill/capture operations in Afghanistan buttress previous accounts of how the Obama administration masks the true number of civilians killed in drone strikes by categorizing unidentified people killed in a strike as enemies, even if they were not the intended targets. The slides also paint a picture of a campaign in Afghanistan aimed not only at eliminating al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, but also at taking out members of other local armed groups.

One top-secret document shows how the terror “watchlist” appears in the terminals of personnel conducting drone operations, linking unique codes associated with cellphone SIM cards and handsets to specific individuals in order to geolocate them.

Taken together, the secret documents lead to the conclusion that Washington’s 14-year high-value targeting campaign suffers from an overreliance on signals intelligence, an apparently incalculable civilian toll

The “find, fix, finish” doctrine that has fueled America’s post-9/11 borderless war is being refined and institutionalized. Whether through the use of drones, night raids, or new platforms yet to be unleashed, these documents lay bare the normalization of assassination as a central component of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

The source said. “But at this point, they have become so addicted to this machine (Drones), to this way of doing business, that it seems like it’s going to become harder and harder to pull them away from it the longer they’re allowed to continue operating in this way.”

Intercept has previously reported, drawn from government watchlists and the work of intelligence, military, and law enforcement agencies. At the time of the study, when someone was destined for the kill list, intelligence analysts created a portrait of a suspect and the threat that person posed, pulling it together “in a condensed format known as a ‘baseball card.’” That information was then bundled with operational information and packaged in a “target information folder” to be “staffed up to higher echelons” for action.

The system for creating baseball cards and targeting packages, according to the source, depends largely on intelligence intercepts and a multi-layered system of fallible, human interpretation. “It isn’t a surefire method,” he said. “You’re relying on the fact that you do have all these very powerful machines, capable of collecting extraordinary amounts of data and information,” which can lead personnel involved in targeted killings to believe they have “godlike powers.”

The source underscored the unreliability of metadata, most often from phone and computer communications intercepts. These sources of information, identified by so-called selectors such as a phone number or email address, are the primary tools used by the military to find, fix, and finish its targets. “It requires an enormous amount of faith in the technology that you’re using,” the source said. “There’s countless instances where I’ve come across intelligence that was faulty.” This, he said, is a primary factor in the killing of civilians. “It’s stunning the number of instances when selectors are misattributed to certain people. And it isn’t until several months or years later that you all of a sudden realize that the entire time you thought you were going after this really hot target, you wind up realizing it was his mother’s phone the whole time.”

Within the special operations community, the source said, the internal view of the people being hunted by the U.S. for possible death by drone strike is: “They have no rights. They have no dignity. They have no humanity to themselves. They’re just a ‘selector’ to an analyst. You eventually get to a point in the target’s life cycle that you are following them, you don’t even refer to them by their actual name.” This practice, he said, contributes to “dehumanizing the people before you’ve even encountered the moral question of ‘is this a legitimate kill or not?’”

The White House and Pentagon boast that the targeted killing program is precise and that civilian deaths are minimal. However, documents detailing a special operations campaign in northeastern Afghanistan, Operation Haymaker, show that between January 2012 and February 2013, U.S. special operations airstrikes killed more than 200 people. Of those, only 35 were the intended targets. During one five-month period of the operation, according to the documents, nearly 90 percent of the people killed in airstrikes were not the intended targets. In Yemen and Somalia, where the U.S. has far more limited intelligence capabilities to confirm the people killed are the intended targets, the equivalent ratios may well be much worse.

“Anyone caught in the vicinity is guilty by association,” the source said. When “a drone strike kills more than one person, there is no guarantee that those persons deserved their fate. … So it’s a phenomenal gamble.”

The documents show that the military designated people it killed in targeted strikes as EKIA — “enemy killed in action” — even if they were not the intended targets of the strike. Unless evidence posthumously emerged to prove the males killed were not terrorists or “unlawful enemy combatants,” EKIA remained their designation, according to the source. That process, he said, “is insane. But we’ve made ourselves comfortable with that. The intelligence community, JSOC, the CIA, and everybody that helps support and prop up these programs, they’re comfortable with that idea.”

The source described official U.S. government statements minimizing the number of civilian casualties inflicted by drone strikes as “exaggerating at best, if not outright lies.”

While many of the documents provided to The Intercept contain explicit internal recommendations for improving unconventional U.S. warfare, the source said that what’s implicit is even more significant. The mentality reflected in the documents on the assassination programs is: “This process can work. We can work out the kinks. We can excuse the mistakes. And eventually we will get it down to the point where we don’t have to continuously come back … and explain why a bunch of innocent people got killed.”

source: https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/the-assassination-complex/

Leaked documents: 

https://theintercept.com/document/2015/10/14/small-footprint-operations-2-13

https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/the-assassination-complex/

https://theintercept.com/document/2015/10/14/operation-haymaker

https://theintercept.com/document/2015/10/14/geolocation-watchlist

Countering the Call: The U.S., Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Religious Extremism in Central Asia by the Brookings Institution: My Thoughts

I have come across this report that was written in July 2003 regarding the policy the U.S should take on countering the call of 'extremist' groups, of which Hizb ut-Tahrir is classed as by the West. It is a particularly interesting read and proves that the call of the Hizb is far threatening to the West, and possibly more-so than violent extremism.

This article sheds a light on how the West are constantly fighting against the Islamic narrative and does not leave any group, no matter how big or small, out of their scope of focus. It is worth noting that this report is targeting the Hizb that was headed by Abd al-Kalim Zallum at the time and currently Ata Abu Rashta, this is why it quite rightly so agrees that the students of this Hizb hold contradictory views and cannot explain their position nor method when prompted. Quite contrast to the students under the correct leadership after the redress in 1997 due to fundamental differences on the method of resuming the Islamic way of life.

It begins by highlighting that the Hizb calls to "restoring the Ottoman Era caliphate" and that "it has been able to harness public popularity primarily through a commitment to nonviolence and an appeal for social and economic justice."

The report interestingly suggests the West's policy towards Hizb ut-Tahrir will set a framework for all other Islamic groups who call for non violent social change:

"Hizb-ut-Tahrir also represents a challenge for broader U.S. policy towards Muslim states and movements. How the United States chooses to respond to the emergence of HT in conjunction with governments in the region, as well as more broadly, sets a framework for how the United States will deal with Islamist groups nominally committed to nonviolent social change, who enjoy increasing grassroots support"

It goes on to suggest that moderating and modernising the Hizb's call to political Islam by including them into the secular and democratic framework "may provide key lessons for crafting a well-informed policy". This is exactly what we are seeing today, whereby Hizb Ata are enjoying platforms with non-Muslims as well as supporting armed groups in the Middle East, which drastically diverts the party from its originally stated method.

It is clear that this report is targeted at Hizb Ata as it states that "This worldwide organization is presently headed by Abd al-Kadim Zallum, also an ethnic Palestinian."

It quite rightly points out that "HT members strongly adhere to the belief that only the formation of an Islamic state regulated by Shariat, Islamic law, can address the ills of society. HT sees the process of modernization and secularization in many Muslim-populated countries as a Western plot against the umma, the Muslim community of believers as a whole."

It suggests that the growth of Hizb ut-Tahrir is partly due to "to underlying economic, social, and political issues that have made Central Asia fertile soil for the introduction of radical ideas." as this report focuses on Central Asia rather than the West. Although we can see that this statement is far from the truth as membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir, whether that be the correct leadership or the misled Hizb Ata has grown in many prosperous countries, such as the West. However it begs the question, whether students studying under the Hizb Ata leadership are serious students or just numbers filling out stadiums and rallies due to their incoherent and contradictory views on the prophetic method to re-establish the Caliphate.

The report has recognised correctly that both Hizb ut-Tahrir and Hizb Ata "calls for a return to Islamic values. In its most extreme political manifestation, the party’s goal is to establish a united Islamic caliphate that would spread from the Middle East through Central Asia to Muslim areas of South Asia."

It also distinguishes Hizb ut-Tahrir different to other 'extremist' Islamic groups by recognising that "an extremely significant factor in HT’s popularity is the party’s rejection of violence as a political means" - which was true in 2003, however the change in tact by Hizb Ata would make one think that there are serious issues internally after they back Jihadi factions in Syria in 2013, and claiming that the 'blessed revolution' has been hijacked.

The report by Khadimov notes that the Hizb's campaigns and leaflets have definitely been a factor in "minimal political participation of the population, the growth of distrust of authority, and skepticism about the utility of democratic institutions".

It goes on to say "growing appeal of its extreme views is a cause of concern for local, national, regional and international actors, including the U.S. government. HT’s rhetoric is often aggressive. It frequently incites anti-Semitic and anti-American sentiments. Following the events of September 11, 2001, HT has focused on casting itself as the voice of all Muslims in Central Asia, while presenting the cooperation of Central Asian governments with the U.S.-led anti-terrorist campaign as treason and tantamount to a war against Islam and Muslims"

It seems to suggest that one way of pushing Hizb members into militant and terrorist activity would be to 'demonize' and 'repress' them so that they feel 'disillusioned' into joining Al-Qaeda or IMU in Uzbekistan where Hizb Ata enjoys a large group of members. 

Quite unsurprisingly, the Brookings Institute has studied the method Hizb ut-Tahrir follow and briefly explained the three stages; the cultural, interaction and the establishment stage. However it is according to Hizb Ata methodology whereby each country has a difference in progress, it mentions that "In Central Asia, HT appears to be in its initial stage". 

Here is how the Brookings Institute has understood the method:

"The first stage is mainly a proselytizing or recruitment phase in which the party reaches out to Muslims in an effort to persuade them to accept the idea, mission, and goals of the party. Convinced individuals are invited to join the party and assume its methods and strategies. They are then expected to join the outreach effort."

"The second stage involves interaction with the umma, taking the message to the broader Muslim community. In this stage, HT attempts to persuade the umma to embrace its view of Islam so that the Islamic way of life becomes an everyday practice for each Muslim and encompasses all affairs of his/her life."

"The third stage sees the establishment of an Islamic government that will implement the norms and practices of Shariat, generally and comprehensively, and will carry it as a message to the world."

It is important to note that the East and West are trying to infiltrate Hizb ut-Tahrir by "planting agents into new HT cells" but are failing to achieve results due to the "veil of secrecy" behind its activities:

"Hizb-ut-Tahrir operates in Central Asian republics in small secretive cells of usually five to seven people called “doiras” or “halkas,” which make-up a large pyramidal structure. Headed by a mushrif (group leader), each group member knows only the members of his/her circle and only the mushrif knows the next stage superior. This arrangement also adds to both HT’s security and the veil of secrecy about its activities and motives. For example, it has made the attempts of the Uzbek police to plant agents in new HT cells and to penetrate the chain of command nearly impossible."

It seems that Hizb Ata have started to "enjoy handsome financial awards and incentives" for new members joining the party according to the report - not surprising to say  the least.

As mentioned earlier I have claimed that members of Hizb Ata fail to explain the method of the Hizb and the same frustration has been noted in this report when it mentions that it is "of particular concern are the vague future plans of HT in Central Asia. HT members often cannot explain how the caliphate would be achieved, what economic or social policies it would pursue, and what the role of other religious traditions and ethnicities in a truly Islamic society would be"

The report admits its frustration with the way in which Hizb ut-Tahrir works by distributing "leaflets and books that often contain scathing criticisms of regional governments. Party activists also rely on underground meetings rather than public speeches. These techniques make Hizb-ut-Tahrir operatives hard to find and to silence. They also let Hizb-ut-Tahrir members send messages more quickly than the government can suppress or discredit them." 

The "challenge is to create mechanisms under which HT could cease its aggressive rhetoric and become involved in the official political process" according to the report. The use of state-supported Imams or clergy is being used to "counter HT's message", however the are "incapable of presenting any credible arguments to counter HT doctrine in mosques" due to being "self-educated individuals with no higher religious education".

It recognises HT members to "enjoy a reputation as highly honest, incorruptible, and determined individuals" 

Finally the report advises the U.S government not to "designate HT as a terrorist organisation" as this would be a "a simplistic move that could legitimize the repressive measures of Central Asian governments" and "Branding Hizb-ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization will have serious implications for regional security. It will further embolden the ongoing official harassment of ordinary believers and lead to widespread public outcry. Such a measure will also be seen by local religious factions as an U.S. effort to support oppressive governments in the war against terrorism. As such, it will undermine U.S.-led efforts to counter Islamic extremism among local populations."

It also advises the U.S to "reconsider encouraging any blanket policy by Central Asian governments of viewing Islamic parties to be the enemy and instead work to bolster Islamic parties’ involvement in political process. The general lesson appears to be that while exclusion of such groups leads to violence, inclusion forces them to compete for voters and offer real governing options, leading them to moderate. Principled support of democracy and human rights, in this regard, is key to moderating radical Islamists."

It finishes off to suggest more backing for moderate imams to counter the Hizb's call. 

The full report here: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2003/7/asia-khamidov/khamidov20030701.pdf

The confederal and autonomous zones of Syria - Master Plan by the U.S.

In June 2015 Brookings Institution released a  paper titled Deconstructing Syria: Towards a regionalized strategy for a confederal country that detailed the policy that the U.S. should take in solving the Syrian crises that was unsurprisingly fomented by them. In this short post I will look at some of the key actions that was suggested and see whether they are being played out today.

In the introduction to the paper it mentions the overall strategy being:

The new approach would seek to break the problem down in a number of localized components of the country, pursuing regional stopgap solutions while envisioning ultimately a more confederal Syria made up of autonomous zones rather than being ruled by a strong central government. It also proposes a path to an intensified train and equip program. Once that program had generated a critical mass of fighters in training locations abroad, it would move to a next stage. Coupled with a U.S. willingness, in collaboration with regional partners, to help defend local safe areas using American airpower as well as special forces support once circumstances are conducive, the Syrian opposition fighters would then establish safe zones in Syria that they would seek to expand and solidify.

At the time, this sort of solution seemed far fetched and ambitious, but we can see today that with the help of Russia, and "U.S. willingness" to this, they can indeed target those factions unfavourable to a permanent solution for Syria after Assad is deposed. It also serves in segregating the Islamic world further by smaller nations already divided on lines in the sand, to a more aggressive sectarian division that is not only based on culture, colour or language but on fundamental religious values and war.

The paper goes on to mention how the confederal arrangement for Syria could be merged using Kurdish region and Jordan:

The strategy would begin by establishing one or two zones in relatively promising locations, such as the Kurdish northeast and perhaps in the country’s south near Jordan, to see how well the concept could work and how fast momentum could be built up. Over time, more might be created, if possible. Ultimately, and ideally, some of the safe zones might merge together as key elements in a future confederal arrangement for the Syrian state.

This may not be apparent right now but certainly is leading up to such a scenario after reports from the Institute of Study of War (ISW).

It is clear that without the support of Turkey and Jordan, these autonomous regions cannot be sustained and therefore they both will have a big role to play in dividing Syria, the report suggests:

Creation of these sanctuaries would produce autonomous zones that would never again have to face the prospect of rule by either Assad or ISIL. They would also constitute areas where humanitarian relief could be supplied, schools reopened, and larger opposition fighting forces recruited, trained, and based. U.N. agencies and NGOs would help in the effort to the extent possible, focusing on health, education, and basic economic recovery in the first instance. Governing councils would be formed, more likely by appointment than election, to help international agencies make decisions on key matters relevant to rudimentary governance. Regardless of details, relief could certainly be provided far more effectively than is the case today. At least one such area should be contiguous to Jordan and one to Turkey, and be created in cooperation with Amman and Ankara. These locations would allow secure transportation lines for humanitarian as well as military supplies. They would also provide bases from which to attack ISIL in its strongholds, a mission that western forces could carry out in conjunction with local allies. 

In the end, the Alawites will be given a zone whereby they can control, leaving Russia and Iran a part of the cake so that they take something away from this end-game. 

The ultimate end-game for these zones would not have to be determined in advance. The interim goal might be a confederal Syria, with several highly autonomous zones. One of those zones might be for Alawites. But none could be for ISIL, al-Nusra, or Assad and his inner circle

The report interestingly goes on to say what Russia and Iran get from this plan of action:

This strategy might soften the opposition to the basic approach by Iran and Russia as well—perhaps reducing their inclination to escalate support for Assad and also possibly even enlisting them in a future negotiated deal about Syria’s ultimate future. Indeed, the strategy strikes a balance in its approach to Iran and Russia. It would grant neither a major role. But it would seek to mitigate the risks of escalating rivalry with them by holding out political hope and the prospect of an autonomous region for Alawites (even those previously associated with the Assad regime, as long as they were not from his inner circle). This approach may appeal even more to Moscow and Teheran to the extent that battlefield dynamics go clearly against Assad in a sustained way, as they have been already in the spring of 2015. 4 Damascus and Moscow would be much more likely to support a confederal Syria to the extent they believe that the alternative had probably become the complete overthrow of Assad and his government—and the elimination of meaningful Alawite influence in a future government—or, in a best case, protracted civil war of indefinite duration. 

Is this not the case today? The invisible handshake between America and Russia clearly states that there is an agreement in place. Iran has also become a major player in the region.

It's worth reading the full PDF here: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/06/23-syria-strategy-ohanlon/23syriastrategyohanlon.pdf