Balkanisation of Syria: Starving the Population into Perpetual War

On 23 February, US Secretary of State John Kerry disclosed to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that separating Syria into multiple states is 'Plan B' if the ceasefire does not work. However it was evidently clear that the ceasefire was inconceivable, if not impossible to achieve due to there being more than 40+ factions on the ground fighting and vying for power. The fighting would rage on through the ceasefire. Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS were not even included in this, leaving the U.S. with plenty of fingers to point at the rebel factions with.

One must realise that Russia were aware of this 'Plan B' from the very moment they stepped into the arena. Russia's sudden withdrawal when the Syrian Regime were in the strongest position they've been in 5 years. They had the ability to take back vast swathes of land from the rebels. This was evident by the fact many of these factions surrendered to the ceasefire to get a break from the Russian onslaught that didn't discriminate between combatant and non-combatants.

This is in line with the U.S. Department of Intelligence document leaked in 2015 in regards to the Syrian campaign. The document mentions that Russia will be there to 'support' the regime. Yet reporters, politicians and neoliberals feigned shock when Russia declared their military intervention - and they had to, as Russia are still the bogeyman for the U.S. to push through foreign policies on the basis of "otherwise Russia will take it".

The withdrawal of Russia has left the Syrian regime in a position whereby if they do not accept the U.S. plan then the rebels will slowly gain back the territory that Russia had helped them recapture. It also left the opposition factions with a threat that air support will not be withdrawn and therefore it is a case of 'take it or leave'. A perfect position for the U.S. proposed plan of balkanising Syria.

Read the full article at: http://kamkashem.com/2016/03/30/balkanisation-of-syria-starving-the-population-into-perpetual-war/

The Three Types of Sectarianism - Washington Institute

A recent article published by the Washington Institute interestingly separates sectarianism into three types.

1) Institutionalized Sectarianism
2) Incidental Sectarianism
3) Exploitative Sectarianism

Institutionalized Sectarianism
"Some groups and states have integrated sectarian themes into the very fabric of their political, cultural, and educational systems. Sectarianism, in other words, has been institutionalized. "
Institutionalized Sectarianism is by far the most dangerous and most difficult form of sectarianism to counter. Examples of this include the likes of Saudi Arabia's Wahhabism and Iran's 'Governance of the Jurists', meaning a regime overseen by scholars. The article goes on to say that this is something ISIS is also seeking to achieve.

Incidental Sectarianism
"...as its name implies, does not involve a deliberate effort to implement a sectarian agenda. Sectarianism does not play a central role in a state or group's objectives, even if there are overtones of it."

Incidental Sectarianism is a form of sectarianism that is evident in conflicts even if that was not the reason for the conflict. The Syrian civil war is an example of this whereby the struggle is not to eradicate the Alawite, but rather the Alawi regime from leadership - but at the same time the opposition uses sectarianism to bolster their ranks. 

Exploitative Sectarianism

"Finally, there is exploitative sectarianism, a category that characterizes the tactics and nature of many of the most violent actors in the region."

The article suggests that most of the larger Jihadi organisations today exploit sectarianism to recruit and to achieve political goals however one could argue that the West not only exploit sectarianism but help in institutionalizing it for their own gains in the Middle East. 

The confederal and autonomous zones of Syria - Master Plan by the U.S.

In June 2015 Brookings Institution released a  paper titled Deconstructing Syria: Towards a regionalized strategy for a confederal country that detailed the policy that the U.S. should take in solving the Syrian crises that was unsurprisingly fomented by them. In this short post I will look at some of the key actions that was suggested and see whether they are being played out today.

In the introduction to the paper it mentions the overall strategy being:

The new approach would seek to break the problem down in a number of localized components of the country, pursuing regional stopgap solutions while envisioning ultimately a more confederal Syria made up of autonomous zones rather than being ruled by a strong central government. It also proposes a path to an intensified train and equip program. Once that program had generated a critical mass of fighters in training locations abroad, it would move to a next stage. Coupled with a U.S. willingness, in collaboration with regional partners, to help defend local safe areas using American airpower as well as special forces support once circumstances are conducive, the Syrian opposition fighters would then establish safe zones in Syria that they would seek to expand and solidify.

At the time, this sort of solution seemed far fetched and ambitious, but we can see today that with the help of Russia, and "U.S. willingness" to this, they can indeed target those factions unfavourable to a permanent solution for Syria after Assad is deposed. It also serves in segregating the Islamic world further by smaller nations already divided on lines in the sand, to a more aggressive sectarian division that is not only based on culture, colour or language but on fundamental religious values and war.

The paper goes on to mention how the confederal arrangement for Syria could be merged using Kurdish region and Jordan:

The strategy would begin by establishing one or two zones in relatively promising locations, such as the Kurdish northeast and perhaps in the country’s south near Jordan, to see how well the concept could work and how fast momentum could be built up. Over time, more might be created, if possible. Ultimately, and ideally, some of the safe zones might merge together as key elements in a future confederal arrangement for the Syrian state.

This may not be apparent right now but certainly is leading up to such a scenario after reports from the Institute of Study of War (ISW).

It is clear that without the support of Turkey and Jordan, these autonomous regions cannot be sustained and therefore they both will have a big role to play in dividing Syria, the report suggests:

Creation of these sanctuaries would produce autonomous zones that would never again have to face the prospect of rule by either Assad or ISIL. They would also constitute areas where humanitarian relief could be supplied, schools reopened, and larger opposition fighting forces recruited, trained, and based. U.N. agencies and NGOs would help in the effort to the extent possible, focusing on health, education, and basic economic recovery in the first instance. Governing councils would be formed, more likely by appointment than election, to help international agencies make decisions on key matters relevant to rudimentary governance. Regardless of details, relief could certainly be provided far more effectively than is the case today. At least one such area should be contiguous to Jordan and one to Turkey, and be created in cooperation with Amman and Ankara. These locations would allow secure transportation lines for humanitarian as well as military supplies. They would also provide bases from which to attack ISIL in its strongholds, a mission that western forces could carry out in conjunction with local allies. 

In the end, the Alawites will be given a zone whereby they can control, leaving Russia and Iran a part of the cake so that they take something away from this end-game. 

The ultimate end-game for these zones would not have to be determined in advance. The interim goal might be a confederal Syria, with several highly autonomous zones. One of those zones might be for Alawites. But none could be for ISIL, al-Nusra, or Assad and his inner circle

The report interestingly goes on to say what Russia and Iran get from this plan of action:

This strategy might soften the opposition to the basic approach by Iran and Russia as well—perhaps reducing their inclination to escalate support for Assad and also possibly even enlisting them in a future negotiated deal about Syria’s ultimate future. Indeed, the strategy strikes a balance in its approach to Iran and Russia. It would grant neither a major role. But it would seek to mitigate the risks of escalating rivalry with them by holding out political hope and the prospect of an autonomous region for Alawites (even those previously associated with the Assad regime, as long as they were not from his inner circle). This approach may appeal even more to Moscow and Teheran to the extent that battlefield dynamics go clearly against Assad in a sustained way, as they have been already in the spring of 2015. 4 Damascus and Moscow would be much more likely to support a confederal Syria to the extent they believe that the alternative had probably become the complete overthrow of Assad and his government—and the elimination of meaningful Alawite influence in a future government—or, in a best case, protracted civil war of indefinite duration. 

Is this not the case today? The invisible handshake between America and Russia clearly states that there is an agreement in place. Iran has also become a major player in the region.

It's worth reading the full PDF here: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/06/23-syria-strategy-ohanlon/23syriastrategyohanlon.pdf