Who Are The Houthis Of Yemen? : Parallels : NPR

http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2015/01/23/379282727/who-are-the-houthis-of-yemen


The Houthis of northern Yemen were an obscure group until recently. But they surged to prominence in September, when the Houthi militia took over parts of Yemen's capital, Sanaa.

Yemen's president, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, was weakened by the Houthi advance and agreed to a deal that allowed the militia to keep control in a number of key areas in Sanaa.

The fragile deal fell apart this week as the Houthis seized the presidential palace and placed more demands on Hadi, who resigned on Thursday. This has plunged Yemen into uncertainty.

Letta Tayler, a senior researcher on terrorism at Human Rights Watch who has closed followed Yemen, spoke to NPR's David Greene about the Houthis, a minority in Yemen who practice an offshoot of Shiite Islam known as Zaidism.

DAVID GREENE: Who are the Houthis?

LETTA TAYLER: They are a real wild card. They're a rebel group from northern Yemen. They have rapidly morphed into the armed faction of a full-fledged political movement. And I guess the most important thing for Americans to know is that part of the Houthi slogan is "God is great." But then it continues, "Death to America, death to Israel."

Does this suggest Yemen is moving into a very dangerous place?

Well, it could indeed be moving into a very dangerous place. But despite the slogan, the Houthis have not harmed Americans, nor have they harmed Israel. It's AQAP [al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula] in Yemen ... that is kidnapping and in some cases killing, foreigners. It's not the Houthis. So again, they're a wild card. We really don't know which direction they might go.

Does the U.S. fight against al-Qaida in Yemen fall apart?

Well, ironically, the one thing that we know that the Houthis and the U.S. government have in common is that they both want to get rid of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. So it may actually work out. It may not be entirely implausible to envision the Houthis and the United States joining in the fight against AQAP. So even marginal but sincere action against the AQAP by the Houthis might be a step forward.

There's something incredibly striking about this narrative.

This is often the way Yemen is. Yemen's politics and intrigue makes the word "Byzantine" seem simplistic. We don't know if Yemen is really sliding into chaos or if it's just continuing to hover on the brink. But we do know that this is a serious challenge for the U.S. government. ...

Combating terrorism is a priority for the Yemeni people, but it is not nearly as high on the priority list as ending government corruption, creating jobs, providing a good education system, ensuring that the country does not run out of water.

So these are the concerns of Yemenis. Yes, AQAP is one of those concerns, but most Yemenis see AQAP as more of a problem for the U.S. government. And they see the U.S. government coming in, not to help fix its own problems, but rather to take out elements of AQAP that may be a threat to the U.S., but not to resolve any of the deep problems of Yemen.

Does anything give you hope for the future of this country?



Every time I go to Yemen, I think, "Can things really get worse?" And then somehow they pop back up. I think the thing that gives me the most hope is the Yemeni people. There are so many people filling the squares and the streets of Yemen who genuinely want change, who will continue to press their demands peacefully, no matter how often they are tempted to try to shed blood. Let's not cross this country off just yet as a failed state.

Yemen - Shiite-Houthi takeover of Sanaa falls in line with Western agenda to create coalition

Source: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/22/yemen-houthi-shiite/

Full Article:

There’s a new boss in Sanaa, but for how long that city is the capital of a unified Yemen, no one quite knows. On Thursday, President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and Prime Minster Khaled Baha stepped down, in the face of a Shiite Houthi insurrection that now threatens to dissolve the Yemeni state as we know it. Their resignations came just one day after Hadi bowed to the northern “invaders,” brokering an agreement with them to end their siege of his home, withdraw their militias from the streets and government institutions, and release abducted Chief of Staff Ahmad Awad bin Mubarak. In return, the government agreed to grant the Houthis the constitutional changes they seek, along with a greater share of power in government and state institutions.

But it’s government itself that may be the greatest casualty. Since the Houthis started their push to power last fall, al Qaeda has exploited the fears of Yemenis who oppose the Shiite group, trying to convince them that it is their natural ally against the Houthis. A sectarian war in Yemen would further strengthen al Qaeda, providing it with more recruits among the disaffected Sunni Yemenis who increasingly view the rise of the Houthis as an existential threat. There are already clear signs of a strengthened al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), including expanded operations and a larger presence across the country.

Southerners have long resented the northern-dominated government, which they believe has historically discriminated against them on everything from political appointments to development projects. The south also never embraced the 1990 unity agreement with the north that created the Yemeni state. These tensions have sparked two armed confrontations, which helped give birth to the independence or secessionist movement (southern factions use both terms). Known as “al-Hirak,” the southern coalition consists of seven different political parties that are roughly united in their quest to build a southern Arab State.

On Jan. 17, the Houthi militia kidnapped Mubarak, the president’s chief of staff, who hails from the southern city of Aden. Houthi tension with Mubarak is well-documented: when Hadi — also a southerner — selected him as his prime minister last year, they vetoed his appointment. Mubarak further angered the Houthis by presiding over a new constitution that proposes to divide Yemen into six federal regions. Such an arrangement would leave the Houthis with an overpopulated area strapped of oil and gas deposits, which are concentrated in the south. The Houthi counterproposal: just two regions, a north and a south.

Events soon accelerated. On January 19, Houthi militias attacked the presidential palace, laid siege to a palace where the prime minister had taken refuge, and fought and defeated Hadi’s guards outside his private residence; they fled, and the Houthis took over their positions. That same day, the Houthis seized the state television and the official Saba news agency. The Twitter account of Information Minister Nadia Sakkaf became the government’s sole means of communicating with the outside world. As chaos engulfed Sanaa, reports also surfaced that authorities in the southern capital of Aden had closed off all air, sea, and land access to the governorate of Aden, in a show of solidarity with the president (himself a southerner).

Now that the Houthis have forced out Hadi, they will consolidate their power, a move likely to hasten Yemen’s dissolution. In a fiery speech on January 20, Al Malak Al Houthi, the Houthis’ leader, outlined his demands, including a national partnership with “southern and revolutionary parties,” and improved security for people in Marib, a governorate some 120 kilometers east of Sanaa. Why Marib? Its oil fields produce 70 percent of Yemen’s oil and gas. But it is also a region dominated by al Qaeda. Just a week before the Houthis moved on the presidential palace in Sanaa, Marib tribes were mobilizing to prevent Houthi militias from entering their province.

The Houthis, for their part, insist that their sole interest in Marib is defending it from al Qaeda. Everyone else is convinced their true intention is to seize control of its oil resources. The governor of Marib has warned that the Houthis want to destabilize the region and endanger Yemen’s interests, and insists that local government and the citizens of Marib reject their presence. Local tribes there supported now-former President Hadi, and claim he gave “direct directions” to protect the province against the Houthis —described by a tribal leader as “occupiers, invaders and terrorists.”

In his January 20 speech, Al Houthi said that his revolution knows “no limits.” Indeed, the Houthis are now empowered to further expand their power into pivotal regions in the south, which could split the southern front as some of its members ally with the new dominant force in the country.

So far, the international community has reacted to the Houthis with a mix of alarm and resignation, peppered with words of condemnation. On January 20, the U.N. Security Council issued a statement supporting President Hadi as the “legitimate authority,” and urging Yemeni parties to solve their differences through dialogue. The Council also condemned the Houthis’ “recourse to violence,” a statement that the United States supported. But aside from sanctioning two Houthi military officials for “threatening the peace” in Yemen, Washington has not exactly been tough on the rebel movement. The tepid international response will undoubtedly further embolden the Houthis.

The civil war also has regional implications. Dr. Abd Al Aziz Al Saqr, head of the Gulf Research Center, said the Gulf states would regard a Houthi-controlled Yemen as unfriendly, due to its close ties with Tehran. If the rebel movement continues apace, this might leave Gulf states “no other option but to support the independence of the south.”

The specter of “limitless” Houthi ambitions, coupled with still-growing power, could be the last straw for a country that is barely clinging to its very existence. At the very least, it can only portend many more months, and probably years, of violence and fragmentation. Now, Yemen stands on the brink of dissolution.