U.S. think-tank CSIS spells out to policy-makers the battle between Islam and Kufr

A recent article published by Anthony H. Cordesman of CSIS emphasises the battle of hearts and minds between the West and the Muslims.

It suggests that the struggle will continue for decades and that "No responsible political figure in the United States or the West can deny these realities. It is also time that our political leaders were honest about the struggle against Islamic extremism and terrorism. It is an ideological battle..." 

We should not take the term 'ideological battle' lightly. In order to defeat an ideology you must ensure those holding the belief, concepts and values of that ideology to abandon it for another, as was the case with Communism. This term alone should stun the believer as it is a clear message that the West will not relent until we have abandoned all that we stand for - Allah and His Messenger, may the peace and blessings be upon him.

It may seem from the apparent that the battle against Islam is happening in the Muslim world alone however the battle cannot be won abroad if it is not expelled from within. The report mentions that:

The core battle will not be fought outside the Islamic world. The United States, Europe, Asian states, and Russia are all on the periphery of the core battle. Defeating terrorism and extremism requires reform and replacing frustration and failed governance with leadership and hope. Moderate Muslim clerics and Muslim governments must demonstrate their legitimacy and defeat extremism at the ideological level.

Using the excuse of terrorism and extremism they are attempting to replace the already corrupt governments in place in the Muslim world with leaders that can push democracy and secularism, something quite clearly planned since the Greater Middle East Initiative in 2004. A Muslim government only holds legitimacy in the West's eyes if She defeats extremism at the ideological level - a clear indication that there is no room for a truly Islamic government or system as the term extremism to the West are those who believe in the Sharia of Allah and the Caliphate.

But, unless the West recognizes the need to keep moderate Muslim states as critical partners in the fight against terrorism and extremism, it will remain a target and risks some extremist movement taking over a state or states that have a Muslim majority.

Does the writer not mean to say 'another' extremist movement to take over a state? It shows that they do not find ISIS to be a credible threat, just a pretext used to further their agenda and they worry that a real Caliphate may rise with a Muslim majority backing it.

The article highlights the fact that the Muslim population will increase rapidly by 2050, over 70%. Pew Research documented the growth over a 10 year period and found the trends to be quite alarming for the West.



The report goes on to state that:

The United States, the West, and other areas outside the Islamic world cannot approach Islam as if it was somehow going to become secular, separate church and state, or Islamic fundamentalism – as distinguished violent from Islamic extremism – was going to disappear.

They accept the fact that Islam itself would not become secular, but instead it is the Muslim rulers and governments ruling over the Muslims who shall be secular in their governing.

In conclusion, many signs of distress are appearing on the once smug face of Capitalism and those who head it. It is our duty not to succumb to their plots and plans and continue on the correct path.

The BDS Movement - a cunning trick on the believers and an excuse for the disbelievers

It seems that every other day someone else jumps onto the bandwagon of boycotting 'Israel' with the aim of deterring it from its plans of total annihilation in Palestine so that it may expand and consume its human and material resources.

We must not be overtaken by emotion and follow devoid of any forethought. Allah (swt) says: "Jihad (holy fighting in Allah's Cause) is ordained for you (Muslims) though you dislike it, and it may be that you dislike a thing which is good for you and that you like a thing which is bad for you. Allah knows but you do not know." (2:216)

It may seem as if the BDS movement is a movement defending Muslims and Al-Aqsa, however Allah (swt) is telling us that there are certain things that may seem from appearance that they are good but in fact they are bad. 

We should already know that every problem man faces in life, Allah (swt) has given its solution via the beloved Messenger of Allah (saw). The issue of Palestine, the Muslims and Al-Aqsa is an issue for the entire Ummah. Therefore we should seek the solution from Islam, and this solution is the permanent solution. 

We can quite clearly see that the Muslims in Palestine do not have the capability to remove the occupation and therefore the responsibility is placed on the surrounding Muslims, a duty of sufficiency. However the barrier to such liberation is the lack of unity, the grip of the despot leaders , the scarcity of understanding and ultimately the absence of an Imam (Caliph) to lead the Ummah.

The BDS movement creates a false sense of relief for the Ummah, and inaction from international powers and organisations. The facts show us that it is the Americans and the Zionists within congress are those who break-even the balances of 'Israel'. Every year the aid is increased to cover any lack of finance for the previous year and the money spent on destroying the Muslims in Palestine.  

In the summary of U.S Aid to Israel by the Congressional Research Service it states:

Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. To date, the United States has provided Israel $124.3 billion (current, or non-inflation-adjusted, dollars) in bilateral assistance 

It goes on to state a number of other agreements that see 'Israel' receiving aid which the BDS movement could only dream of reaching its numbers. The annual FMF (Foreign Military Finance) is now increasing by 1 billion dollars.

Israeli media sources have said that the United States and Israel have held “preliminary” discussions over future military assistance with Israel seeking between $4.2 billion and $4.5 billion in annual FMF. 

Is this increase in aid for 'Israel' worth it for the Americans? Well of course! Why you ask?

• It nullifies nations from seeking justice on behalf of the Palestinians through international law.
• Allows the politicians in 'Israel' to stoke up hatred between the 'Zionists and the others', creating an "us and them" mentality, to push through draconian laws and further slaughter of Palestinian Muslims in cold blood without warrant or accountability.
• Gives the Zionist congress in America further reason to increase their support for the illegal entity, and thus bankrolling any new military development for defending their 'homeland'.
• Allows the U.S. to test out its latest advancements in military technology against the Muslims who are unarmed and unequipped. 

The longer we stay idle on this oppression and seek justice from other than Islam, the humiliation will continue and our noses will be rubbed in the dirt on the Day of Judgement while those who have been martyred in Jerusalem, West Bank, Gaza and all over, shall get the justice they deserve, Paradise. 

“We were the most humiliated people on earth and Allah gave us honour through Islam. If we ever seek honour through anything else, Allah will humiliate us again.” Umar ibn al Khattab (ra).

Three paths for the U.S to maintain its hegemony on the world including another 9/11 attack?

RAND, a leading political and security think-tank in America, have recently published a report, third in its series titled 'Friend, Foes and Future Directions: U.S. Partnerships in a Turbulent World, Strategic Rethink'

It states that the U.S. have three stances that it can take in the coming year(s).

To mitigate this mismatch, U.S. policymakers have at least three general approaches to consider:

• First, the United States could take an assertive approach focused primarily on American values, thereby limiting compromise with potential adversaries. Washington would seek a few capable partners but would be prepared to go it alone or with a small coalition of the willing if needed. This “assertive engagement” option would require a significant increase in defense spending. 

• Second, the United States could seek greater defense contributions from allies and partners. Under such a policy, termed “collaborative engagement,” the United States would act based primarily on its interests and would seek to further harmonize its policies more with its major allies and strategic partners. It would be more dependent on the will of its partners and would be inclined to seek some accommodation, where possible, with potential adversaries. It would be more restrained in its policy choices and stress regional trade partnerships.

• Third, the United States could reduce its ambitions and focus on only the most critical challenges to its own vital national interests. In some cases, it might need to reduce its commitments to partners. It would stress homeland resilience and seek to find surrogates to take the lead wherever possible. This alternative is called “retrenchment.”

 It is important to note what the term allies and partners means. The Washington Institute would write in a recent article that:

Saudi Arabia and the United States have been partners -- not allies. Typically, America's allies share values and not just interests.

United States view partners as those who do not share the same values and ideals however share common interests, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. However a partner are those who share the values and ideals such as freedoms and democracy. This includes the likes of Great Britain, France and Germany.

The report goes on to suggest that if the U.S. were to take the first path it would require a massive amount of economic support and such support would not be possible without the American public and therefore only a stunt such as 9/11 could sway public opinion in agreement.

One U.S. election is unlikely to fundamentally change those constraints. It would probably take another direct attack on the homeland, like 9/11, to shift both public opinion and spending priorities enough to finance this approach.

However it is quite clear that the second pathway is preferred under the Obama administration, making use of its partners in the region such as Iran and Saudi.

Grand Imam of al-Azhar refuses a fatwa to allow takfir of ISIS

It may come as a surprise that the grand Imam of Al-Azhar Ahmed el-Tayeb has refused to issue a fatwa to excommunicate ISIS members, i.e. a fatwa to allow the takfir (excommunication from Islam) of ISIS members.

Either they don't wish to engage in heated dialogue which would only clarify the issue of making takfir on another brother or they're succumbing to a public opinion that regards the aims of ISIS to be noble but the method to be incorrect and fatal, i.e. the concept of Khilafah is correct however the method of establishing it via force to be incorrect.

My opinion would be the former. Al-Azhar is still seen to many Muslims around the Middle East to be the voice of reason and truth. Their fatwa's are followed by millions even though they lack political gain for Islam. In fact, it is known that many of the fatwa's issued by these big renowned Islamic institutions come at a time where America requires the Muslims blood to boil and rise to fight America and the West's wars. It remains silent for the cause of the Muslims dying in Palestine to the hands of the Israeli's who have stolen the land and reaped its resources, it remains silent for those suffering at the hands of brutal monks in Burma, it remains silent when the West intervene in the Muslims affairs, it remains silent when the dictators slaughter the believers and it remains silent when it is so badly needed to unite the Ummah and lead it forth into liberation.

If they were to entertain the discussion of takfirism which they so desperately need in order to split the Ummah on sectarianism then it would only clarify and crystallise the understanding of making takfir on another brother. Many Muslims would give a brother 70 excuses before excommunicating them from Islam as the severity of such words could cost them their own success in the hereafter.

Allah's Messenger (ﷺ) said, "If a man says to his brother, O Kafir (disbeliever)!' Then surely one of them is such (i.e., a Kafir). "

Turkey swings to the West and the Muslims lose hope in Islam

Just a decade ago Turkey had met the set of democracy and governance-related requirements as a candidate for the European Union. Their economy was booming and their policy of keeping peace with neighbours allowed them to trade with ease and efficiency. They were setting themselves as a model democracy for the Middle East and the Muslims.

However, there has been a growing call by the Muslims across the globe for Islam to be implemented politically and not just spiritually. In order to preserve the progress Turkey had made, She had to listen to these wishes in a way that would not send liberal democracy a death sentence.

Thus began the brandishing of the Holy Qur'an by Erdogan in order to quell the thirst of the Muslims. It included the introduction of interest-free banking and tougher laws on religious marriages and adultery.

However this move to a more 'Islamic'-coated democracy, which is far from Islam, has introduced other domestic issues which were kept quiet a decade ago. The once quiet neighbour policy of the Turkish government to an aggressive stance that heavily includes themselves in the Syria and Iraq quagmire as well as the forerunner in the refugee crises, has brought about terrorist attacks and a struggling economy that has now broken ties with Russia that supplied 60% of its countries energy after the downing of the Russian jet.

What has this new turn in Turkish politics achieved?

1. When the Muslims lose their high standard of living, it'll bring doubts into many that Islam cannot play any role in politics, even though currently this form of picking and choosing from Islam does not make a secular state into an Islamic state. 
2. The Muslims have experienced gradualism under the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and now a democracy led by 'Islamists' - both which have failed them domestically, in order to make the Muslims lose hope in Islam as a political ideology.
3. Turkey will fall into the arms of both the EU and the U.S. which will force it to abandon the little Islam it has in governance in return for a booming economy and strong alliance once again. 

The longer the AKP use a heavy hand on the Kurds the faster its popularity will diminish, allowing for the opposition to ride the waves of secular democracy devoid of any religious laws to take the front seat and affirm that Islam cannot achieve the basic needs of the people. No wonder Erdogan had sought to take a higher role that will make him immune to the coming changes? 

This also leads one to believe that this U.S and Russia antipathy towards each other, is but a farcical to delude and deceive their own masses in order to effectuate change. 

The U.S. has achieved more than it has bargained for with this new direction by Turkey. The abandonment of the Chinese missile deal and the reconciliation with 'Israel', as well as the improved cooperation with NATO means there will be closely aligned agenda on Syria and Iraq with the U.S. 

It will be interesting to see how the AKP fare domestically after this huge swing to the West for Turkey. 

The Arab Spring seemed natural, but it was far from it...

Recently published book "Fall of the Arab Spring: From Revolution to Destruction" examines modern imperialism vis-à-vis the so-called ‘Arab Spring.’


‘Liberal imperialism’ has continued to evolve. A more novel method for modern imperialism includes the use of the ‘color revolution.’ Adherents of this method, such as Peter Ackerman of the Albert Einstein Institute (AEI) and Carl Gershman of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (See Chapter II), argue unfriendly regimes can be toppled by mobilizing swarms of discontented adolescents, via mass communication media such as SMS, Facebook and Twitter. Illustrating its appeal to the Obama team, this later tactic of ‘civilian-based power’ was utilized as the initial driving force of the so-called ‘Arab Spring,’ and was later superseded by direct military intervention and America’s newest unconventional model of warfare.



Despite evidence to the contrary, the mainstream narrative is that the wave of uprisings against the status quo autocratic Arab regimes were entirely organic. Additionally, a narrative sometimes found in alternative media is that these uprisings were initially organic, but were subsequently hijacked or diverted by the West and Gulf state monarchies. The latter narrative is given credence through the West’s direct military intervention to topple Muammar Qaddafi’s government in Libya. Both of these notions are specious. The idea that romantic Arab youth activists alone initiated the attempt to topple their autocratic regimes is a myth. The objective of Fall of the Arab Spring is to shatter this prevailing mythology.



In truth, the so-called “Arab Spring”which swept through the MENA region was a wave of destabilizations sponsored by Washington and launched through ‘civilian-based power’ techniques. It was American imperialism of the most modern form. With the onset of multipolarity—with many of Washington’s vassals looking to resurgent power centers such as Moscow and Beijing—the US moved pre-emptively for ‘regime change’ against the independence of ‘enemy’ states and erstwhile clients. Additionally, the ‘Arab Spring’ offensive was given impetus by the imperative to accelerate the regional process of what Bernard Lewis, perhaps the most influential British Arabist, termed “Lebanonization” as a self- fulfilling prophecy. [3] This refers to the far-reaching balkanization, societal breakdown, and explosion of sectarian conflicts following the attenuation or collapse of the state—the model of Somalia.


You can buy the book from Amazon. 

I've ordered it and I'll probably write some blog posts regarding it inshaAllah.

The Different Types of Salafi's

A new article recently published on WarOnTheRocks raised some interesting points regarding the two types of Salafi's the West need to deal with.

I've collated some of the main points here:

If we want to stop the self-proclaimed Islamic State’s recruitment to violence, a better question is how does the group transform centuries-old theological concepts into real and present threats?

Answering that question requires that we begin by stipulating that the Islamic State is a Salafi organization. Salafism is based on an exclusive adherence to this early Islamic Sunni theology. Next, we must recognize the historical division of Salafism between violent and non-violent strains in the 20th century under specific political conditions. Finally, and perhaps most urgently, we might consider the lessons of this history for our own strategic planning today.

Because of its emphasis on redefining Islamic faith and practice, Salafis — both violent and non-violent ones — prioritize their attention on fellow Muslims (Sufis, Shi‘is, even non-Salafi Sunnis) for promoting what they regard as “deviant” interpretations of the faith.

So why do some use this to attack others violently, while others only do so rhetorically? There is only one conceptual factor that drives this decision: the reason why others, in the eyes of different Salafis, fail to adopt their worldview. To non-violent Salafis, the reason they give is misinformation and misunderstanding — not having been exposed to their theological views. Innocence by omission. For violent ones, the reason is because of a deliberate resistance to it — an expression of the internal “unbelief” in God’s monotheism (kufr). Guilt by commission, and commission of the religion’s gravest sin, violating God’s “oneness.”

This divide is nearly as old as the religion itself, and was a core question underlying the evolution of early Islamic theology. On the one hand there stood Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855CE) and his circle (the so-called People of Hadith), who held that one’s faith is expressed in one’s “heart, tongue and limbs.” On the other, the more rationalist schools argued that this faith is only in the heart and tongue and need not be confirmed by actions of the limbs.

This debate surfaced in the 20th century as a fault line between violent and non-violent Salafis, who — unlike other Sunnis — ostensibly all identified with the People of Hadith in their theology, but who, in practice, came to different conclusions about the practical implications of this theology. The watershed moment came in 1986, when one Safar al-Hawali (b. 1950) put the finishing touches on his dissertation for the Saudi Umm al-Qura University. In it, Hawali — who, although not a jihadist, would be later regarded as something of their intellectual ally — attacked one Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999) for the latter’s view that one’s failure to pray was not a sign of “unbelief,” but rather could have been caused by laziness, oversleeping, or some other non-doctrinal factor. For Hawali, a Muslim’s neglect of proper Islamic conduct was evidence of ceasing to be Muslim. For Albani, who would later become the doyen of the so-called “quietist” strain of Salafism, a Muslim’s neglect of prayer was a sin but did not change one’s Muslim status.

In the 1990s, these positions became the core kernel of a new and broader debate on the issue of takfir (excommunication of other Muslims). Specifically, under what circumstances may Muslims excommunicate other Muslims, and thereby justify engaging in violence against them? On the one hand there were those who believed, as Hawali did, that failure to act in an Islamic way nullified one’s Islamic identity — these formed the intellectual nucleus of jihadism. On the other stood the quietists, Albani’s progeny, who resisted drawing the link between the need to behave in an Islamic way and the reasons for not doing so.

This became the debate between violent Salafis (or jihadists) and the non-violent ones (quietists), and the labels they used to attack one another are revealing of the sensitivities of each. Quietist Salafis almost universally refrain from referring to jihadists by their proper ideological designation as “Salafi-jihadists,” but rather use the term “takfiri” or “extremist,” referring to their singular focus on using takfir as a justification for wanton bloodletting. Quietist Salafis further argue that they too have principles of takfir and jihad, but that these are enshrined in a “methodology” — i.e. there is a time and a place for them. The names of early Islamic sects are also commonly invoked as labels for each group, but these are used strategically in a derogatory way and do not, as we saw earlier, reflect the actual theological positions on which each relies (examples include “Kharijites” for jihadists, and “Murji’ites” for quietists). In other words, their use is akin to how Westerners would freely use the “Fascist” label to describe any form of bigotry, despite its frequently ahistorical use.

It goes on to interestingly state that the Salafi's are not different to those who compromise their deen and enter into the political framework. The author recognises himself that this is in itself unislamic yet the Salafi's do not?

In Egypt, perhaps noting Sisi’s wide-ranging crackdown on journalists, Salafis continue to lament the “media campaigns” against them as their primary concern. Salafis have even competed in elections — a violation of one of their cardinal principles of rejecting modern institutions — since that, for them, was a mechanism of survival within the specific context of Egyptian politics under Sisi. Indeed, over the last year, Egypt’s Salafi Nour Party was able to navigate the country’s political turbulence by branding itself an ally of the state in combatting terrorism, rather than siding with their pro-Morsi Salafi counterparts in demanding Sisi’s ouster. In short, these examples demonstrate that the survival of Salafi groups within local political circumstances are just as much expressions of their pragmatic skills as they are of their ideological commitments. However, since their ideology is often used as justification for the decisions they make, one might also conclude that, just as with the divide between non-violent and violent Salafism at the end of the last century, the practical implications of Salafi ideology in the present century is equally conditioned by local contexts as it is by long-established theological concepts.